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We measure the repo funding extended by money market funds (MMF) and securities lenders to the
shadow banking system, including quantities, haircuts, and repo rates by type of underlying collateral.
We find that repo played only a small role in funding private sector assets prior to the crisis, as most
repos are backed by Treasury and Agency collateral. Repo with private sector collateral contracts during
the crisis, but the magnitude is relatively insignificant compared with the contraction in asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP). While relatively small in aggregate, the contraction in repo particularly
affected key dealer banks with large exposures to private sector securities, which then had knock-on
effects on security markets, and led these dealer banks to resort to the Fed's emergency lending programs.
We also find that haircuts in MMF-to-dealer repo rise less than the dealer-to-dealer or dealer-to-hedge
fund repo haircuts reported in earlier papers. This finding suggests that the contraction in repo led
dealers to take defensive actions, given their own capital and liquidity problems, raising credit terms
to their borrowers. The picture that emerges from these findings looks less like a traditional bank run
of depositors and more like a credit crunch among dealer banks.
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Most analyses of the nancial crisis of 2007-09 highlight the rapid expansion of the
shadow banking sector in the period from 2000 to 2007 and the subsequent collapse
of the sector during the crisis (see Adrian and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier (2009),
Gorton and Metrick (2011b)). A wide variety of loans, including residential mortgages,
auto loans, and credit card loans, which a decade ago were held by the commercial
banking sector and nanced by bank deposits were instead held by shadow banks and
nanced by repurchase agreements (repo) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
(see Figure 1). Like deposits of traditional banks, the repo and ABCP liabilities created
by shadow banks were of short-maturity. However, unlike for traditional bank deposits,
there was no regulatory structure that oered safety to the shadow-bank \depositors".
In a series of papers, Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011a, 2011b) have argued that the
repo market played a key role in the collapse of the shadow banking system through a
\run on repo" very much akin to the runs on commercial banks that plagued the U.S.
prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.
Much of the discussion of the repo market has run ahead of our measurement of the
repo market (see Geanakoplos (2009); Gorton and Metrick (2011a); Shleifer (2010)).
Because of a lack of data, we know little about basic questions: How much did the
shadow banking system rely on repo for its short-term funding? How much did it
contract during the crisis? How much of repo funding provided by non-banks was
collateralized by (securitized) private-sector assets? Did this change during the crisis?
As a consequence, it is dicult to evaluate the role played by the repo market in
propagating shocks during the nancial crisis.
Our objective is to ll this gap with a new data set on the repo agreements between
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Figure 1: Short-term Funding Flows in the Shadow Banking System. The biggest cash
lenders to the shadow banking system are money market funds (MMF) and securities
lenders (SL). MMF take short-term funds from retail investors, institutions and corpo-
rations, and promise to preserve a xed $1 net asset value. SL are large institutional
investors or custodians for institutional portfolios who lend securities to short-sellers
and in return receive cash, as collateral, that they seek to reinvest. A substantial por-
tion of funding provided by MMF and SL to the shadow banking system is provided
in collateralized form with repurchase agreements (repo) or asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP). Repo is used by broker/dealers to fund their securities inventory, e.g.
of asset-backed securities (ABS) and to fund repo loans that they provide to clients,
e.g. hedge funds. ABCP is issued by special purpose vehicles (SPV) set up (usually by
commercial banks) for the purpose of purchasing long-term ABS. The repos between
MMF/SL and broker/dealers are typically tri-party repos, in which a custodian bank
safeguards the collateral on behalf of the cash lender. Repos between broker/dealers
and hedge funds are typically bilateral repos without a third party custodian to stand
between.
2non-bank lenders and dealer banks. To assess the funding conditions for the shadow
banking system as a whole, we focus on the repo funding ows that enter the shadow
banking system (through the tri-party repo market on the right-hand side of Figure 1)
rather than the inter(shadow)bank repo lending between dealers, and between dealers
and hedge funds. Statistics on aggregate repo volume in the U.S. such as the commonly
cited Primary Dealer repo survey of the Federal Reserve do not distinguish between
the ows into the shadow banking system and the ows within the system. Volume
statistics are computed by adding up all repos along the intermediation chain from
non-banks to dealers, dealers to dealers, and dealers to hedge funds. The quantity
of interbank repo is informative about the length of intermediation chains within the
shadow banking system, but not about how the shadow banking system funds itself in
aggregate vis-a-vis non-banks.1
To isolate the repo funding ows provided by non-banks, we use data on the repo
market activities of money market funds (MMF) complemented with data on repos of
security lenders (SL). These sectors are signicant lenders of cash in the repo market.
For example, in 2007Q2, they lent a total of $940bn of cash in the repo market, which
accounts for about two thirds of the total repo funding ows from non-bank lenders to
shadow banks. The MMF data is extracted from quarterly SEC lings of MMF. The
SL data is from the Risk Management Association (RMA). We also analyze data from
the Federal Reserve's emergency lending programs in 2008 and 2009 to understand how
much these actions counteracted a contraction in the repo market.
We start by examining the question of how signicant was repo in funding private
1For the very same reason, interbank deposits are not counted in the calculation of money stock
measures like M2. However, the quantity of interbank repo may be relevant for other questions that
are not our focus here. For example, a high level of interdealer repo could aect the probability that
defaults propagate from dealer to dealer in the same way as a high level of interdealer over-the-counter
derivatives exposures could (Due and Zhu (2010)). Our focus, however, is not on the systemic risk
contribution of interdealer repos but on the role of repo for shadow bank funding in aggregate.
3sector assets prior to the crisis. That is, a key channel suggested by the \run on
repo" theory is that the growth in repo prior to the crisis drove the shadow banking
sector and the expansion of privately securitized assets. We do not nd support for this
channel. Only a small portion of the outstanding amount of mortgage- and asset-backed
securities created in the private sector (private-label ABS) is used as collateral in repo
funding. In the period before the crisis, repo from MMF and SL collateralized with
private-label ABS total $151bn, which implies that only 3% of outstanding private-
label ABS is nanced by repo from MMF or SL. Most of the repo funding extended
by MMF and SL is collateralized with Treasury or Agency-backed securities.
ABCP and direct holdings of privately securitized assets by MMF and SL play a
more signicant role than repo as short-term funding sources for the shadow banking
system. In the period before the crisis, ABCP nances 22% of the outstanding private-
label ABS, which is an order of magnitude larger than repo.
As the crisis unfolds from 2007Q2 to 2009Q2, the short-term funding of private-
label ABS contracts by $1.4 trillion. Of this, $662bn comes from the reduction in
outstanding ABCP while only $151bn of the contraction comes from the reduction of
repo with private-label ABS collateral. The remainder comes from a contraction of
direct holdings of private-label ABS by MMF and SL. Moreover, the contraction in
the short-term funding appears rst in the ABCP market during the summer of 2007
(Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009)). The decline in private-label ABS repo does not
appear signicant until the collapse of Bear Stearns in 2008Q1.
These ndings are consistent with the views of many commentators that a contrac-
tion in the short-term debt of shadow banks played an important role in the collapse of
the shadow banking sector, but they are inconsistent with the view that a run on repo
played the central role. The more signicant short-term debt contraction occurs in
4ABCP. The latter observation is important for understanding the mechanism through
which the short-term debt contraction aected the nancial system. While both ABCP
and repo are collateralized forms of short-term debt, ABCP typically receives liquidity
support guarantees from a commercial bank rather than a broker/dealer. Commercial
banks were aected early in the crisis in the fall of 2007, but shocks to their nancing
were relatively well contained because of their access to Federal Reserve lending facili-
ties. The key role played by ABCP and the regulated sector also gives greater weight
to the regulatory arbitrage arguments of Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) as being
an important factor in driving the growth of the shadow banking system.
A second key channel through which the \run on repo" may have contributed to the
crisis is through the eects of repo contraction on systemically important institutions.
That is, while the contraction in repo was relatively insignicant for shadow bank
funding in aggregate, its eects may have been amplied if the contraction dispropor-
tionately aected key institutions. We nd evidence that is supportive of this channel.
First, repo funding of private-label ABS collapses from $151bn pre-crisis to about $2bn
in the rst quarter of 2009. We present evidence that this collapse was likely due to
the unwillingness of MMF to lend against risky or illiquid collateral, and not due to
an unwillingness to lend to specic counterparties. The aggregate contraction in repo
leads to a decrease in repo funding for the dealer banks that are most reliant on the
repo market to fund private collateral at the outbreak of the crisis. These banks in-
clude Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup; in short, four
of the key players in the nancial sector. These dealer banks also have the highest
perceived credit risk in September 2008, and they borrow most heavily from the TSLF
and PDCF emergency lending programs of the Federal Reserve. It is dicult to pin
down, however, how much of this was a causal eect of a refusal of repo lenders to ex-
5tend funding against risky/illiquid collateral, and to what extent dependence on private
collateral is just a symptom of weak capital positions, diculty in obtaining unsecured
funding, loss of brokerage business, and collateral calls by derivatives counterparties,
as discussed in Due (2010).
Our results also highlight that to understand the role of repo during the crisis, it is
important to distinguish between funding conditions that dealer banks face when they
borrow cash from MMF and SL via (largely tri-party) repo from the funding terms
that dealer banks oer when they lend via (largely bilateral) repo to other dealers
or hedge funds. Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011b) document that haircuts in the
interbank market rose dramatically in the crisis, while we nd much smaller increases
in the MMF-to-dealer bank haircuts (see also Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010)).
Gorton and Metrick report the largest haircuts for private-label ABS securities, for
which we observe no transactions between MMF and dealer banks at the height of the
crisis.
To reconcile these ndings, it is important to keep in mind that dealer banks are
more capable than an MMF of disposing collateral in the event of a default by a repo
counterparty and of assessing the risk of counterparty. In contrast, our data suggest
that MMF stop lending when collateral becomes too illiquid or risky. The picture that
emerges from our analysis is that MMF and SL are analogous to \bank depositors"
who place their funds with dealer banks through the tri-party repo market. These
dealer banks in turn are like informed lenders who then pass these funds on to hedge
funds and others dealers through the bilateral repo market. Our data suggest that
the \depositors" pulled back from dealer banks during the crisis. The Gorton and
Metrick ndings show that the dealer banks pulled back much more dramatically in
their interbank lending to other dealers and their credit extension to hedge funds.
6Overall, the picture therefore looks less like the analogue of a traditional bank run
by depositors and more like a credit-crunch in which dealers acted defensively given
their own capital and liquidity problems, raising credit terms to their borrowers. These
higher credit terms are manifest in the higher haircuts observed by Gorton and Metrick.
To fully understand the dierential behavior of the bilateral and triparty repo markets,
one needs quantity data on the bilateral market. To our knowledge, no such data exists
either publicly or with regulators.
The main concern with the validity of these conclusions is whether we are missing
important repo lenders and thus do not have a full picture of the repo funding extended
by non-banks. In 2007Q4, our total coverage of repo from MMF and SL is $1.1tn. The
Flow of Funds accounts for 2007Q4 (December 2010 release) report that the other large
repo lenders were State and Local Governments ($163bn),2 Government Sponsored
Enterprises ($143bn), and Rest of the World ($338bn). If these Flow of Funds estimates
are correct, then our data covers about two-thirds of repo lenders. However, because
data on the repo market is scant, there is uncertainty in these Flow of Funds estimates.
Our own cursory investigations of other possible repo lenders has not turned up any
other signicant sources of funding. In particular, while corporations were cash-rich
during this period, any repo lending they do appears to be via institutional MMF,
indicating that corporate lending is covered in our MMF sample. The Treasury's TIC
data puts the repo lending of foreign central banks at between $100 and $200bn (these
numbers are likely incorporated in the Flow of Funds' Rest of the World entry).
The paper most related to ours is Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010) who ex-
2Repos by state and local governments are typically backed by Treasury and Agency collateral, and
are therefore not a likely funding source for private-label ABS. For example, California Government
Code Section 53601 restricts repo collateral to government, agency, and municipal securities and prime
commercial paper. In Illinois, the Deposit of State Moneys Act (15 ILCS 520/22.5) allows only repo
collateralized by government securities.
7amine data on tri-party repo provided by the two tri-party agents, Bank of New York
Mellon and JPMorgan Chase, from July 2008 onwards. Their data has the advan-
tage that it is high frequency, and, for example, sheds light on the Lehman Brothers
failure. However, their sample is shorter and does not start until the middle of the
nancial crisis. We are particularly interested in understanding how the private-label
ABS stock was nanced pre-crisis, how this nancing changed through the crisis, and
how it compares with alternative funding sources such as ABCP. Their data is less
suited to answering this question. Their data also includes GCF repo which is a type
of interdealer repo, and thus creates the double counting problem we have discussed
earlier. Nevertheless, their ndings are similar to ours. Repo with private-label ABS
collateral is a small fraction of total repo. They document a rise in haircuts on repo
against private-label ABS which is similar in magnitude to our own ndings. They
also nd that haircuts on Treasuries and Agency securities remain relatively constant
during the crisis. The most signicant dierence in our respective ndings is we nd
little variation in haircuts across counterparties, while they nd substantial variation.
At least part of the dierence in these ndings is due to the fact that their sample
has a more signicant representation of smaller dealer banks, and it appears that these
banks drive the counterparty-specic haircut variation.
II Repurchase Agreements
We start by describing the main features of repurchase agreements that are important
for understanding our results. We then describe the Money Market Fund SEC lings
and the securities lender data that we use in the analysis. A more in-depth treatment
of the institutional features of the repo market can be found, e.g., in Due (1996),
8Garbade (2006), and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010).
A Background on Repurchase Agreements
A repo involves the simultaneous sale and forward agreement to repurchase the same,
or a similar, security at some point in the future. Eectively, a repo constitutes a
collateralized loan in which a cash-rich party lends to a borrower and receives securities
as collateral until the loan is repaid. The borrower pays the cash lender interest in the
form of the repo rate. The borrower typically also has to post collateral in excess of the
notional amount of the loan (the "haircut"). The haircut is dened as 1   F=C with
collateral value C and notional amount F. For example, a repo in which the borrower
receives a loan of $95m might require collateral worth $100m, implying a haircut of
5%.3
Repos constitute an important funding source for dealer banks. They use repos
to nance securities held on their balance sheets (as market-making inventory, ware-
housing during the intermediate stages of securitization, or for trading purposes), or
to nance repo loans they provided to clients such as hedge funds. In the latter case,
dealer banks re-hypothecate the collateral they receive from hedge funds to use as col-
lateral in their repos with cash lenders. King (2008) estimates that about half of the
nancial instruments held by dealer banks were nanced through repos.
In the years before the nancial crisis, repos became an important funding source
for the shadow banking system. Just like the traditional banking system, the shadow
banking system raised short-term funding and directed these short-term funds into
3An central development in the 1980s that spurred the growth of repo was that repos received
an exemption from automatic stay in bankruptcy (Garbade (2006)). This exemption allows the cash
lender in a repo to sell the collateral immediately in the event of default by the borrower without
having to await the outcome of lengthy bankruptcy proceedings, thereby reducing the counterparty
risk exposure of the cash lender.
9relatively illiquid long-term investments, such as corporate securities and loans, as
well residential and commercial mortgages, as illustrated in Figure 1. MMF and SL
provided a large part of this short-term funding (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky
(2010)).
MMF promise their investors a constant net-asset value (\$1 NAV"), which eec-
tively makes their investors' claims similar to the demand deposits of the traditional
banking system (but without deposit insurance). Some of the funding provided by
MMF went into securitized products through vehicles that issued asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP), but a signicant part also went via repo to nancial institutions
that held securitized products and other securities on their balance sheets.
SL are another cash-rich party that directed funds to the shadow banking system.
These institutions, as part of being custodians for a large amount of bonds and equity,
lend out these securities to investors who wish to establish short positions in bond or
stock markets. The shorting investor will typically leave cash with the security lender
equal (or greater) than the value of the securities borrowed from the security lender.
As a result, security lenders come into possession of a large amount of cash that they
seek to reinvest in the money markets. A signicant share of this cash went into repos
and ABCP.
The repo that we examine in this paper are known as tri-party repos.4 In a tri-party
repo, a clearing bank stands as an agent between the borrower and the cash lender, as
illustrated in Figure 2. In the U.S., this role is performed either by JPMorgan Chase
or Bank of New York Mellon. The clearing bank ensures that the repo is properly
collateralized within the terms that cash lender and borrower agreed to in the repo
4The other type of repo is known as a bilateral repo. Repo between dealer banks, or between a
dealer bank and a hedge fund are typically bilateral, while repo between dealer banks and MMF/SL
are typically tri-party. These two contracts may have dierent terms in practice (repo rates and
haircuts).
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Figure 2: Tri-Party Repurchase Agreements
(haircut, marking-to-market, and type of securities). The motivation for this tri-party
arrangement is to enable cash lenders like MMF that may not have the capability
to handle collateral ows and assess collateral valuations to participate in this market
without running the risk of the counterparty might not provide the required collateral.5
The risks for a cash lender in a repo are principally that the borrower defaults and
the lender does not have sucient collateral to recover the lent amount. For MMF,
there is an additional concern that if the borrower defaults and the collateral is illiquid,
the MMF will be stuck with the collateral for an extended period. SEC rules place limits
on the amount of illiquid/long-term securities that that an MMF can hold. Finally,
there is repo risk unique to the tri-party market that stems from the so-called daily
\unwind." Irrespective of the term of the repo, the clearing bank unwinds the repo every
morning by depositing cash in the cash-lenders' deposit account with the custodian and
by extending an intraday overdraft and returning the collateral to the borrower for use
in deliveries during the day. If the term of the repo has not expired, or if the lender
and borrower agree, bilaterally, to renew the repo, a \rewind" takes place at the end of
the business day, whereby securities are transferred from the borrower's to the lender's
5Garbade (2006) discusses incidents prior to the development of the tri-party repo market in which
borrowers had failed to properly collateralize loans.
11security accounts with the clearing bank, and cash is transferred from the cash lender's
to the borrower's deposit accounts. Thus, the cash lender is a secured lender overnight,
with the securities underlying the repo serving as collateral, but during the day the
cash lender becomes an unsecured depositor in the tri-party custodian.6 Thus, the
risks to a cash lender overnight stem from the interaction of counterparty risk of the
borrower (a) with risk of collateral value changes and illiquidity of underlying collateral
(b). Intraday, the risks to a cash lender stem from the counterparty risk of the clearing
bank (c).
The lender can protect against (b) by raising the haircut on the repo contract.
Reducing the amount of repo lending can be a response to all three risks. The lender
can also raise the repo rate to compensate for all three risks, although in practice this
appears to be a less signicant margin.
Finally, during the sample period we study, there was considerable uncertainty
about how a default of a repo borrower would play out in the tri-party repo market.
According to the Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force (see Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (2010)), it was not clear for the cash investor if, when, and how
a repo trade would be unwound and how the collateral liquidation process would be
carried out. The ambiguity over these matters may also aect participation in the repo
market.
6The potential systemic risk created by the huge intraday overdrafts extended by the two tri-party
custodian banks to broker/dealers have also lead to eorts to change the practices in the tri-party
repo market (see Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010)), but for the sample period we study in
this paper, the market functioned in the way we described.
12B Repo Data
Mutual funds le a portfolio holdings report every quarter on forms N-CSR, N-CSRS,
and N-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This ling requirements
also extends to MMF. The typical report of an MMF lists their holdings of certicates of
deposits, commercial paper, and repurchase agreements. For repos, the reports list each
repurchase agreement with the notional amount, repo rate, initiation date, repurchase
date, counterparty, the type of collateral, and, in most cases, the value of the collateral
at the report date. The level of detail about the underlying collateral varies between
funds. Some report fairly detailed categories, while others only report broad classes,
such as \U.S. Treasury Bonds", \Government Agency Obligations", or \Corporate
Bonds", often with a maturity range. Typically a portfolio of securities serves as
collateral, but only rarely are the value-weights of dierent classes of securities in the
portfolio reported. In most cases, though, the collateral portfolio consists of securities
of the same type (e.g., U.S. Treasury bonds of dierent maturities and vintages, rather
than Treasury bonds mixed with corporate bonds or asset-backed securities).
We collect the quarterly lings from the SEC website with ling dates between Jan-
uary 2007 and June 2010. We parse the lings electronically and extract the repurchase
agreement information. We collect the data for the 20 biggest fund money market fund
families at the end of 2006, identied from a ranking of money market fund families
obtained from Cranedata (see Appendix A for a list of the families in the sample). This
yields a data set of approximately 16,000 repos. As the market for money market funds
is fairly concentrated, with the biggest 20 fund families accounting for more than 80%
of total net assets, our data should give us a fairly complete picture of the repo market
between MMF and dealer banks. In all of the computations below, we extrapolate the
MMF data we have collected to the entire MMF sector by scaling it up to match the
13total repo from the Flow of Funds accounts (FoF) each quarter. While we refer to the
funds in our sample in general as MMF, some funds in the sample are enhanced cash
funds that are, strictly speaking, not money market funds, as they do not adhere to
the investment restrictions for money market funds in SEC rule 2a-7 and particularly
do not aim for $1 NAV. Also, not necessarily all of the repos in our data are tri-party,
but conversations with market participants conrmed that the vast majority of MMF
repo are tri-party.
To analyze securities lenders, the second main class of providers of short-term fund-
ing to shadow banks, we obtain data from the Risk Management Association (RMA).
The RMA conducts a quarterly survey of major securities lenders and reports statis-
tics on their aggregate portfolio of cash collateral reinvestments, including direct in-
vestments as well as repo agreements. Appendix B provides more detail on the data,
including a list of survey participants quarter-by-quarter. The RMA data combine
repo with private-label ABS and corporate debt into one category. We impute the
split between private-label ABS and corporate debt based on the assumption that
their relative proportion is the same as the corresponding proportion in MMF repos.
III Quantity and Composition of Repo Funding
We use the repo data to tackle the rst and most basic question: What is the total
amount of repo funding that MMF and SL extend to the shadow banking system? We
then look at the composition of repo funding by type of collateral.
14A Quantity of Repo Funding
The rst column in Table I reports the aggregate amount of repos undertaken by MMF
in our SEC lings data set. In 2006Q4 we have only partial coverage because we miss
2006Q4 reports led before January 2007. For comparison, the second column shows
the aggregate amount of MMF repo outstanding according to the FoF, and the third
column shows the total amount of MMF assets, also from the FoF. Our data set covers
roughly 80-90% of oustanding MMF repo. Repos account for about 15-20% of total
MMF assets.
Column four reports the total amount of repo oustanding in securities lenders' cash
collateral reinvestment portfolios. Until 2008Q2, this number is of comparable magni-
tude as the total amount of MMF repo, but it contracts more strongly in subsequent
quarters. This is likely driven by the fact that the total amount of cash collateral
available to SL for reinvestment contracted sharply around the peak of the crisis. The
amount of MMF repo did not shrink appreciably until 2009Q2. One factor driving
the total size of MMF repo seems to be the ows in and out of MMF. MMF assets
increased by about 50% from 2007Q1 to 2009Q2.
The nal column shows the end-of-quarter amount of total Primary Dealer repos
outstanding, as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A comparison
of these numbers with the total amount of MMF and SL repo shows an interesting
and stark contrast: The Fed's Primary Dealer repo numbers are about four times as
high as the MMF and SL repos combined. This dierence arises because the Primary
Dealer statistics aggregate all repo transactions of Primary Dealers, including repos
done between dealers and with hedge funds, while the MMF and SL repo covers only
the funding raised from non-banks to shadow banks.
Repos between shadow bank intermediaries are common and involve re-hypothecation
15Table I: Quantity of Repo Funding Provided by Money Market Funds and Securities
Lenders
Money Market Funds Securities Lenders Primary
Collected Total Total Cash Dealer
Quarter Repo Repo2 Assets2 Repo Collateral Repo3
2006Q4 2431 395 2,312 431 1,594 3,442
2007Q1 324 387 2,372 527 1,834 3,619
2007Q2 331 426 2,466 504 1,902 3,889
2007Q3 412 528 2,780 522 1,754 3,886
2007Q4 483 606 3,033 478 1,712 4,106
2008Q1 501 592 3,383 467 1,537 4,278
2008Q2 466 518 3,318 509 1,790 4,222
2008Q3 433 592 3,355 490 1,519 3,989
2008Q4 479 542 3,757 228 954 3,208
2009Q1 546 562 3,739 212 779 2,743
2009Q2 507 488 3,585 257 882 2,582
2009Q3 495 495 3,363 244 865 2,499
2009Q4 472 480 3,259 229 850 2,469
2010Q1 427 440 2,931 263 837 2,477
1 Incomplete coverage of funds in MMF sample in 2006Q4.
2 Source: Flow of Funds Accounts.
3 Source: Federal Reseve Bank of New York
of collateral along the intermediation chain. As an example, suppose dealer bank A
lends $1 to a hedge fund via a repo (collateralized by $1.02 of Treasuries),7 and then
borrows the $1 from dealer bank B via a repo (collateralized by the same $1.02 of
Treasuries), who then borrows $1 from a MMF (collateralized by the same $1.02 of
Treasuries). The MMF does not re-hypothecate collateral. This chain is typical in
the repo market, as dealer banks both borrow and lend cash and rehypothecate collat-
eral extensively (Singh and Aitken (2010)). Note that sum of repo loans across these
four institutions is $3. The Fed's Primary Dealer statistics would report total repos
7From the perspective of the hedge fund, this is a repo, from the perspective of dealer bank A it
is a reverse repo
16of $2, i.e., the sum of the two repos that involve dealers as the party receiving funds.
However, the amount of repo funding extended by non-banks to the shadow banking
sector is only the $1 from the MMF to dealer bank B. Interdealer repos do not raise
funding for the shadow banking system, but instead reallocate funds within the shadow
banking system.
Repos between shadow bank intermediaries and hedge fund also often involve si-
multaneous repo/reverse-repo trades in which a dealer obtains one security as collateral
(say, a Treasury bond) from a hedge fund client in a reverse-repo transaction and at
the same time delivers another one (say, a corporate bond) to the same hedge fund in
a repo transaction. These transactions are eectively just an exchange of one security
against another and hence do not provide net funding to dealer banks. The repo leg
of these trades is included in the Fed's Primary Dealer repo statistics.8
For these reasons, the amount of repo funding provided by non-banks shadow banks,
and the extent of its contraction, cannot be inferred from the Federal Reserve's Pri-
mary Dealer repo statistics. Estimates of the total size of the repo market based
on the Primary Dealer repo numbers, as in Adrian and Shin (2009) or Gorton and
Metrick (2011b), are dicult to interpret, because these estimates do not distinguish
between length of intermediation chains within the shadow banking system from the
repo funding raised from outside the system.
A better benchmark against which to compare our data coverage is the size of the
8The substantial extent of these simultaneous repo/reverse repo transactions can be estimated
from dealers' o-balance sheet pledged collateral. FASB interpretation (FIN) 41 allows netting of the
repo and reverse repo if they are both with the same counterparty and same maturity. For example,
Goldman Sachs' broker/dealer subsidiary reported, in its November 2006 FOCUS report led with the
SEC, a total of $489bn of collateral owned or received that was pledged, while the balance sheet only
reports a total of $306bn repos, securities loaned, and nancial instruments sold but not yet purchased.
The dierence of $183bn likely reects repos netted with reverse repos, or similar transactions, that
satised the requirements for netting of FIN 41. See King (2008) for similar calculations for several
dealer banks in 2008.
17tri-party repo market. According to data from Bank of New York Mellon and J.P.
Morgan, the total amount of tri-party repo was roughly $2.5 trillion at the end of
2007 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010)), which compares with about $1.1
trillion of MMF and SL repo in our data. However, the Bank of New York Mellon and
J.P. Morgan numbers also include GCF repo, which is a form of interdealer repo (see
Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010)). The Flow of Funds Accounts (December 2010
release) suggest that the major cash lenders in the repo market apart from MMF and SL
at the end of 2007 include state and local governments with ($163.3bn), government
sponsored enterprises ($142.7bn) and rest of the world ($338.4bn). These numbers
suggest that our MMF and SL data captures about two thirds of the repo funding
provided to the shadow banking system.
The distinction between non-bank lending to dealers and interbank lending along
the intermediation chain is also important for understanding the changes in repo out-
standing around the peak of the nancial crisis. As Table I shows, Primary Dealer repo
outstanding contracted by 40% between 2008Q2 and 2009Q2, while total MMF and SL
repo contracted by only 27% over the same time period, starting from a much smaller
dollar number, and with almost all of the contraction driven by SL repo. Thus, the
total amount of repo (and re-hypothecation) along the intermediation chain contracted
more than the credit extended by non-bank repo lenders. The contraction in primary
dealer repo therefore also overstates the contraction in the amount of credit extension
by shadow banks to the economy more broadly.9
9Ignoring the (small) amount of equity in the shadow banking system, the amount of credit ex-
tended by the shadow banking system to households, corporations, etc., equals the amount of credit
the shadow banking system receives from MMF and SL. The amount of interbank repo is informative
about the length of intermediation chains, but not about the amount of credit received from and
extended to the rest of the economy. This logic is analogous to similar considerations about interbank
deposits in the calculation of the money stock. Interbank deposits are not included in M2, because M2
is meant to measure the amount of funding provided by the non-bank public to the banking system.
By excluding interbank deposits, M2 also measures the quantity of loans to non-bank entities that are
18The shortening of intermediation chains that is implied by the sharp contraction in
Primary Dealer repo may be informative about other problems in the shadow banking
system that are not our focus here. For example, dealers may have tried to reduce
network exposures to vulnerable dealers, which made them more reluctant to lend to
each other, and which inhibited the ecient allocation of liquidity within the shadow
banking system.
B Composition by Type of Collateral
We next turn to evaluating the conjecture by Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011a, 2011b)
that private-label ABS played an important role as the collateral that backed repo
\money."
Figure 3 presents the share (by notional value) accounted for by dierent collateral
categories, reported for each quarter. The \Agency" category includes both Agency
bonds and Agency-backed MBS (many funds lump these together when reporting col-
lateral, so we cannot distinguish them in most cases). The \Priv. ABS" category
includes private-label ABS. The \Corporate" category refers to corporate debt, and
the \Other" category is composed mainly of equities, whole loan repos, and some
commercial paper, certicates of deposit, and municipal debt.
In general, Treasury and Agency securities account for the majority of collateral in
MMF repos. Private-label ABS make up less than 10% of MMF repo collateral prior
to the crisis, which corresponds to about $31 billion in terms of value. For security
lenders, Agency and Treasury securities account for roughly 50% of repo, with private
label collateral making up a more signicant portion of the porfolio.
Private-label ABS disappears as collateral from MMF as the nancial crisis reached
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Figure 3: Share of Collateral Types for Money Market Fund Repo (top) and SL repo
(bottom). The RMA data for securities lenders combines corporate and private-label
ABS collateral. The split shown in this gure is imputed based on the assumption that
the relative proportion of corporate and private-label ABS collateral is the same as for
MMF.
20its peak in 2008. Corporate debt also disappears almost entirely. Thus, riskier and
less liquid collateral were not used for nancing in the tri-party repo market at that
time. For SL, we observe the same pattern of a reduction in the share of riskier and
less liquid collateral during the crisis. The disappearance of private credit instruments
as collateral is less extreme, though, than for MMF. The reduction of repo against
private-label ABS reects the \run on repo" that many have commented on and we
will delve more into this run in the next sections.
IV Short-term Funding of Private Credit Instru-
ments
We next ask how repo compares as a funding source for private-sector securitized
assets to other forms of short-term funding. We focus particularly on the importance
of ABCP vis-a-vis repo because both are proto-typical shadow banking transactions
involving relatively safe short-term funding a private sector asset.
A Short-term Funding at the Onset of the Financial Crisis
The rst row of Table II presents data on the total outstanding U.S. private-label
ABS in 2007Q2. The $5.275tn outstanding is the heart of what is commonly referred
to as the shadow-banking sector; i.e., residential mortgages and other loans that are
held in securitization pools or in SPVs. The main sub-categories in the $5.275tn are
roughly $3 trillion private-label RMBS and CMBS (data from the Securities Industry
and Financial Market Association), which include about $1.4 trillion subprime RMBS
outstanding at the onset of the crisis (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008)).
21Table II: Funding of Outstanding U.S. private-label ABS and Corporate Bonds in
2007Q2
private-label ABS Corporate Bonds
Amount % Amount %




MMF 243 5% 179 3%
Securities lenders 502 10% 369 7%
Repo4
MMF 31 1% 42 1%
Securities lenders 120 2% 166 3%
Total short-term 2,069 40% 755 14%
1 Souce: SIFMA for ABS, where ABS is ex CDOs (assuming CDOs are largely repackaged ABS);
Flow of Funds for corporate bonds, ex bonds issued by foreigners and ABS issuers.
2 Source: Federal Reserve Board.
3 Source: Risk management Association (RMA) for securities lenders, and Flow of Funds for total
direct holdings by MMF of corporate bonds including ABS. The direct holdings estimate for MMF is
based on the assumption that the ratio of private-label ABS holdings to corporate bonds is the same
for MMF as the observed one for securities lenders.
4 RMA (securities lenders) and SEC lings (MMF). The MMF repo numbers from our SEC lings
data are scaled up to match the total amount of MMF repo according to the Flow of Funds. The
RMA data combines repos with corporate and private-label ABS collateral. The repo estimate for
securities lenders is based on the assumption that the ratio of repos with private-label ABS to repos
with corporate debt securities collateral is the same for securities lenders as the observed one for MMF.
22We also provide data on the outstanding corporate bonds as some of these securities
(e.g., bonds used to nance LBOs, senior bank loans) also comprise the shadow banking
sector. The outstanding amount of corporate debt, excluding commercial paper, was
$5.591 trillion in 2007Q2.
The table also details the amount of these securities nanced by repo from MMF
or SL. Total repo of private-label ABS is $151bn. Even if we include the repo extended
against corporate bonds, the repo total is only $359bn. This is a small fraction of the
outstanding assets of shadow banks. This observation underscores a principal nding
of this study: repo was of far less importance in funding the shadow-banking sector
than is commonly assumed.
If repo was not the principal source of funding, what was? The table details the
direct holdings of these securities by MMF and SL. The direct holdings are substantial,
totaling $745bn. It is likely that such holdings are high grade and short maturity
tranches of securitization deals. The largest source of funding is ABCP of $1,173bn.
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) note that the assets in the SPVs nanced by
ABCP are a 50-50 mix of ABS and other loans (receivables or whole bank loans).
Nevertheless, as they point out, one can think of ABCP as part of a securitization chain
where commercial paper is issued against loans and other securities. The comparison
between ABCP and repo shows that ABCP was probably more important as a stress-
point for the shadow banking system.
23B Contraction in Short-term Funding During the Financial
Crisis
Table III documents the contraction in short-term funding of the shadow banking
sector between 2007Q2 and 2009Q1. Total repo for private-label ABS goes to almost
zero. However, as we have noted the quantity of contraction is modest since repo was
a relatively small source of funding. The contraction in repo funding accounts for only
about 10% of the total short-term funding contraction of roughly $1.4 trillion.
A striking fact is that repo with private-label ABS collateral completely disappears.
Thus, even though the total contraction is small, it seems possible that institutions that
were entirely reliant on repo were particularly aected by the reduction in repo. We
return to this point later in the paper. For example, this observation may square with
accounts of the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (see Due (2010)).
For the entire shadow bank sector though, the more important contraction was in
ABCP, which falls by $662bn. Direct holdings of ABS by MMF and security lenders
also falls by $568bn. The bottom panel of the table documents the contraction in
corporate bonds. The contraction is more modest, and this is likely driven by the fact
that the corporate bond category mixes in securities which are not of interest (e.g.,
Aaa corporate bonds).
Figure 4 illustrates the contraction in ABCP and repo graphically, quarter-by-
quarter. The gure compares the amount of repo with private-label ABS collateral
with the amount of ABCP outstanding (data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board),
net of the amount funded through the Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (see Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchoni (2010)). The contraction in ABCP
starts earlier than that of repo and continues steadily through the crisis. The repo
24Table III: Contraction in Short-term Funding
2007Q2 2009Q1 Contraction
private-label ABS
ABCP1 1173.2 511.0 -662.2
Direct holdings
MMF3 243.3 59.4 -183.9
Securities lenders2 501.6 116.0 -385.6
Repo
MMF 30.5 0.3 -30.2




MMF3 178.9 158.4 -20.5
Securities lenders 368.7 309.1 -59.6
Repo
MMF 42.1 9.7 -32.4
Securities lenders4 165.6 49.3 -116.3
Total -228.8
1 Source: Federal Reserve Board. ABCP outstanding less the amount of ABCP nanced through the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility ($116.8bn in 2009Q1).
2 Part of these holdings is in the form of ABCP, part in direct holdings of long-term ABS (i.e.,
possible double-counting with ABCP)
3 The direct holdings estimate for MMF is based on the assumption that the ratio of private-label
ABS holdings to corporate bonds is the same for MMF as the observed one for securities lenders.
4 Risk management Association (RMA) and SEC lings (MMF). The RMA data combines repos
with corporate and private-label ABS collateral. The repo estimate for securities lenders is based on
the assumption that the share of repos with private-label ABS to repos with corporate debt securities
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Figure 4: Comparison of private-label ABS repo with ABCP outstanding (ex CPFF)
contraction occurs in a small window around 2008 Q1, roughly corresponding to the
failure Bear Stearns. The fact that the contraction in repo with private-label ABS
starts later than ABCP indicates that the initial cracks in the shadow bank funding
appeared in ABCP, not in the repo market.
The contraction in both repo and ABCP are consistent with the views of many
commentators that a contraction in the short-term debt of shadow banks played an
important role in the collapse of the shadow banking sector. However, it is important
to note that the ABCP plays a more important role than repo in this regard. This
observation is important for understanding the mechanism through which the short-
term debt contraction aected the nancial system. While both ABCP and repo
are collateralized forms of short-term debt, ABCP typically receives liquidity support
guarantees from a commercial bank rather than a broker/dealer. When the SPVs
backed by ABCP could no longer roll over their short-term debt, their assets came
26back onto the balance sheets of sponsoring banks (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009), He,
Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010)), spreading the problem to the regulated banking
system. However, the liquidity problems created by the loss of funding was relatively
contained because the commercial banks had direct access to funding from the Federal
Reserve. The problem that commercial banks faced as a consequence was less one of
funding liquidity than the problem that supposedly o-balance sheet assets of dubious
value migrated back onto their balance sheets depleting their capital.
The relative importance of ABCP in funding private-label ABS also sheds some
light on potential drivers of the run-up in short-term debt nancing prior to the crisis.
The fact that the run-up and crash was concentrated in a part of the shadow banking
system that operated with implicit and explicit (but o-balance sheet) support from
regulated banks supports the regulatory arbitrage arguments of Acharya, Schnabl,
and Suarez (2010). The extensive involvement of European commercial banks in the
ABCP business further points towards the global imbalances argument of Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2009) and the global banking glut theory of Shin (2011).
C Demand or Supply?
One thorny issue to sort out from this data is whether or not the contraction in out-
standing volumes was driven by supply forces or demand forces. That is, one interpre-
tation of this data is that cash investors including MMF and SL change their portfolios
to avoid ABS repo and ABCP ("repo demand"). But it is also possible that hedge
funds and dealer banks ("repo supply"), motivated by the increased risk and uncer-
tainty in asset markets, chose to reduce their holdings of securities and hence no longer
needed funding from the repo markets.
The quantity data is suggestive of a demand contraction (we discuss the price data
27in the next section). First, the outstanding amount of securities in SPVs backing ABCP
was essentially xed over this period. That is, banks sponsored the SPVs, lled them
with loans and securities, and issued ABCP and other claims against them, letting
them wind down as the loans and securities matured. The banks were not taking an
active decision to increase or decrease the loans/securities in the SPV. Thus, at least
for ABCP, it is likely that all of the action is driven by demand forces. Since ABCP
and repo are close substitutes for an MMF or SL, it is likely that the desire to not own
ABCP is mirrored in a desire to not own repo. Thus, it is likely that the contraction
in repo is also driven by demand forces.
Second, the fact that repo quantity goes to zero also suggests that demand was at
work. While dealer banks and hedge funds reduce their holdings of ABS/MBS over this
period (see He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010)), they did not reduce their holdings
to zero.
Last, ows into money market funds provide another indication that the contrac-
tion was driven by demand-side eects. From September to December 2008, taxable
government money market funds received inows of $489 billion while taxable non-
government money market funds experienced outows of $234 billion (data from the
Investment Company Institute). Thus, part of the reduction in repo of non-goverment
securities, and the increase in repo with government securities during the later stages
of the crisis may have been driven by investors' reallocation between money market
funds that invest only in government securities and other money market funds.
28V Repo Terms During the Financial Crisis
This section presents data on the evolution of the terms of repo contracts, including
repo rates, haircuts, and repo maturities. The analysis is based on the MMF repo data.
The data we present suggests that the \price" of repo borrowing rose over the crisis.
In conjunction with the quantity evidence, the results further suggests that a central
factor driving repo market dynamics in the crisis was the desire of cash lenders to avoid
lending against ABS collateral. The data on the change of contract terms also suggest
that it is a combination of risk-aversion and illiquidity aversion that drives cash lender
behavior.
A Maturity Compression
Figure 5 illustrates the shortening in the maturity structure of repos over the crisis.
In general, the majority of repo contracts are overnight. In equal-weighted terms (top
panel), the 90th percentile reached 120 business days in 2007, but it subsequently
shrank to 20 business days. In value-weighted terms (bottom panel), the gure shows
a similar pattern, but the maturity compression is more concentrated in the tail since
the overwhelming majority of large repos are overnight. The reduction in maturity
is consistent with an increased demand for liquidity from cash-investors, since shorter
maturity repo is de-facto more liquid than longer maturity repo. Krishnamurthy (2010)
provides evidence of investors' increased desire for liquidity over the crisis, as reected
in a number of dierent asset markets. That is, the data in Figure 5 is reective of a
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Figure 5: Percentiles of Repo Maturities
30B Haircuts
Figure 6 plots the value-weighted average haircuts for dierent categories of collateral
over the sample period. Since MMF le at dierent month-ends throughout each
quarter, we can calculate these averages at a monthly frequency. The line for private-
label ABS has a gap from late 2008 to late 2009, as this type of collateral completely
disappeared during this period (see Figure 3). It is apparent that haircuts for non-
Treasury and private-label collateral increased signicantly from 2007 to 2010 from
around 3-4% to about 5-7% for corporate debt and private-label ABS. The similarity
of haircut time patterns for private-label ABS and for corporate bonds also suggest that
the problem was more generalized and not something specic to securitized assets. All
of these patterns are suggestive of cash investors' desire to avoid risk/illiquidity in their
repo loans.
An important observation from this data is that the patterns in haircuts that we
observe in the tri-party repo market appear dierent from the bilateral interdealer repo
haircuts reported in Gorton and Metrick (2011b).10 First, in Gorton and Metrick's
data average haircuts are frequently zero in 2007 for corporate debt and securitized
products, while the MMF repos in our data always have average haircuts of at least 2%,
even for Treasuries and Agency debt. Second, although our value-weighted averages
(which is the most relevant measure of aggregate funding conditions) are dicult to
compare with the equal-weighted averages in ner categories reported in Gorton and
Metrick (2011b), an informal comparison suggests that haircuts in tri-party repos of
MMF increased much less than the haircuts in their interdealer repo data (Gorton and
Metrick report average haircuts in excess of 50% for several categories of corporate
10While our ndings on haircuts are at odds with Gorton and Metrick (2011b), they are similar to


















Figure 6: Haircuts by Collateral Type (weighted by notional value)
debt and securitized products).
Taken together with our ndings of the relatively small amounts of MMF repos
against private-label ABS collateral, these observations suggest that the \run on repo"
may have had a more modest eect on aggregate funding conditions for the shadow
banking system than what one may guess from the enormous increase in haircuts for
securitized products in the bilateral interdealer repo market as reported by Gorton and
Metrick (2011b).
Finally, there are some surprising patterns in this data. First, the increase in
haircuts does not revert following the peak of the nancial crisis in 2008. Haircut
levels in 2010 are still as high, or even higher than at the end of 2008. Second, average
haircuts for Agency collateral remained the same as those for Treasury obligations,
32despite the troubles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the summer of 2008.
C Repo Rates
Figure 7 presents time-series of value-weighted average overnight repo rates (weighted
by notional amounts). As a benchmark for comparison, we use the Federal Funds rate
as a default-free rate proxy.11
As shown in Panel (a) of Figure 7, the average overnight repo rate for Treasury
collateral typically tracks the Fed Funds rate quite closely, but there are some striking
deviations. Starting in 2007, the repo rate on Treasuries drops below the Fed Funds
rate. This wedge reaches a maximum of almost 100bps in 2008Q1. It is apparent
that Treasuries as a class represented preferred collateral, and as Treasury collateral
was scarce, the repo rates on this collateral fell substantially below other risk-free
benchmarks. Note that the repo rate here is the general collateral repo rate and not
the \special" collateral repo rate as discussed in Due (1996). Indeed, this evidence
is more consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) who argue that
Treasuries as a class, command a collateral/liquidity premium. Fleming, Hrung, and
Keane (2010) investigate the low Treasury repo rate phenomenon in detail and show
that the implementation of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in March 2008,
in which the Federal Reserve lent Treasury securities against non-Treasury collateral,
helped to reduce the repo premium on Treasuries.
There is substantial variation in the repo rate by category of collateral, as evidenced
in Panel (b) of Figure 7. The spread between the Fed funds rate and the repo rate for
Agency debt, corporate debt, and private-label ABS increased from close to zero in 2007
to almost 200bps in 2008Q1. The higher rates are consistent with cash investors' desire
11The Federal Funds rate is an overnight rate and as such almost free of default risk.
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Figure 7: Average Repo Rates (weighted by notional value)
34to avoid lending against risky/illiquid collateral and scarcity of Treasury collateral
around the time of the Bear Stearns collapse. The spread drops after the introduction
of the TSLF in March 2008, but it spikes again in September 2008 following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. Private-label ABS collateral was almost absent at that time, but a
small volume of repo transactions took place at an average repo rate spread to Treasury
collateral of around 500bps. Corporate debt collateral commanded a similar spread.
In contrast, repo rates for Agency debt did not increase.
A nal observation from this data is that unlike haircuts in Figure 6, these repo
rate spreads have reverted to near pre-crisis levels as nancial markets normalized in
2009 and 2010. It is noteworthy that quantities and haircuts on some asset classes
have continued to reect stress conditions. A possible explanation is that market par-
ticipants' assessment of the risks of private debt instruments was permanently changed
by the nancial crisis.
VI Cross-sectional Patterns by Repo Counterparty
We now turn to evaluating another channel through which the repo contraction may
have contributed to the crisis. While the contraction in repo was relatively insignicant
for shadow bank funding in aggregate, its eects may have been amplied if the con-
traction disproportionately aected key institutions. This section presents some data
that is supportive of this channel. It also presents data to shed light on how the repo
contraction aected specic banks. It is possible that some dealer banks may have
had higher exposures than others to private debt instruments, and therefore suered
more from the run on repo with risky/illiquid collateral. It is also possible that some
dealer banks may have been perceived as more prone to default than others, which
35may have led cash lenders to run on repo of these banks, irrespective of the type of
collateral oered. To shed light on these possibilities, we examine how the contraction
in repo funding with private collateral played out in the cross-section of counterpar-
ties, and whether dierent counterparties faced dierent repo terms (haircuts, repo
rates) around the peak of the nancial crisis. Since we only have cross-sectional data
by counterparty for MMF repos, but not for SL repos, a caveat is that the following
analysis only captures a partial picture of the total repo funding ows from non-banks
to dealer banks.
A Changes in Repo Quantities by Counterparty
Dealer banks that were most reliant on repo funding for private collateral in the pre-
crisis period should be expected to have been more aected by the crisis. To measure
their pre-crisis reliance on private collateral repo funding we focus on the period prior
to the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 as this was the time just before repo
volumes with private collateral started to contract. Since each MMF les holdings
reports only every three months, sum up the repo funding amounts per counterparty
over three month windows.12 For each counterparty, we calculate the pre-Bear Stearns
(BSC) amounts of repo with dierent collateral types by summing MMF repos over
the three months from December 2007 to February 2008. The latter date is when repo
funding with private collateral starts to contract (see Figure 4). We then compare these
numbers with the repo funding post-Lehman (LEH) (September 2008 to November
2008).
12Otherwise one would run into the problem that a counterparty might nance Treasuries with one
MMF that les the holdings, say, at the end of February and private-label MBS with a dierent MMF
that les holdings at the end of January. Looking at the repo funding amounts in February would
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Figure 8: Contraction/Expansion in MMF Repo from Pre-Bear Stearns (Dec. 07 to
Feb. 08) to Post-Lehman (Sep. 08 to Nov. 08). Change expressed as share of total
MMF repo in pre-Bear Stearns period (Dec. 07 to Feb. 08).
37Figure 8 shows how repo funding contracted or expanded for each repo counterparty
in our data from the pre-BSC period to the post-LEH period, where the change is
expressed as a fraction of each counterparty's total repo funding from MMF in the
pre-BSC period. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers are not included in this plot,
as we cannot compute their post-LEH repo funding, but further below we will show
data on their private collateral shares in the pre-BSC period. The top panel plots the
change in total Repo funding against the pre-BSC private collateral share. The gure
shows that there was substantial heterogeneity in reliance on private debt instruments
as repo collateral. Mizhuo (MFG), Royal Bank of Scotland/Greenwich (RBS), Societe
Generale (SCGLY), Barclays (BCS) have private collateral shares of close to zero, while
Merrill Lynch (ML), Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS), and Citigroup (C)
have private collateral shares of almost 50%. Wachovia (WB) is an outlier with a
private collateral share above 80%. The change in total repo funding from the pre-
BSC to the post-LEH period is negatively correlated with the private collateral share
in the pre-BSC period. Total repo funding expanded for most counterparties, but it
contracted for many of those that had relatively high private collateral shares before
the nancial crisis reached its peak.
The two panels below break the change in total repo funding into the change in repo
funding with Treasury and Agency collateral (middle) and the change in repo funding
with private collateral (bottom). They show that the change in total repo funding has
two drivers: (a) repo funding with Treasury and Agency collateral expands for most
counterparties, except those with high pre-BSC private collateral shares; (b) repo with
private collateral disappears almost completely for all counterparties (which leads to a
regression slope of approximately -1.0 in the bottom panel).
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Figure 9: Maximum CDS Rates After Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Plotted Against
Private Collateral Share in MMF Repo during the Three Months Prior to Bear Stearns
Rescue (December 2007 to February 2008). Maximum of CDS rates between day of
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (September 15, 2008) and end of year 2008. Bear Stearns'
and Lehman Brothers' CDS rates in this plot are the maximum CDS rates prior to
rescue/failure. The regression line has a slope of 1445 with t-statistic 4.57.
in the pre-BSC period are also more likely to be among those that had the highest
perceived default risk around the peak of the nancial crisis, as measured by each
counterparty's maximum 5-year CDS rate in the time period following the bankruptcy
of Lehman until the end of 2008. To illustrate where Lehman and Bear Stearns are
located in terms of their private collateral share, the plot also includes these two coun-
terparties with their CDS rate set to the maximum value attained at any time prior to
the rescue or bankruptcy.
Even though the counterparties with the highest pre-BSC private collateral shares
were perceived as most at risk to default, Figure 8 shows that these counterparties
39did not generally reduce the amount of repo with Treasury and Agency collateral.
Morgan Stanley, the counterparty with the second highest perceived default risk at the
end of September 2008 and the third highest private collateral share in the pre-BSC
period, even increased its amount of repo funding with Treasury and Agency collateral
substantially. While these ndings are subject to the caveat that we only observe MMF
repos, and not repos with SL and other cash providers, they are suggestive that repo
funding with high-quality collateral remained available even for dealer banks with high
perceived default risk.
Some accounts of the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman suggest that these dealer
banks did indeed experience diculty in rolling over repo on all forms of collateral, but
only in the last days before failure. This is not captured in our low-frequency MMF repo
data. Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010) present daily data on Lehman's tri-party
repo book in September 2008 and document that the total amount of repo funding
started to contract substantially only a few days prior to Lehman's bankruptcy ling.
They show that the contraction aected all collateral categories, including Treasury
collateral.
B Repo Terms by Counterparty on September 30, 2008
Funding diculties of dealer banks with high perceived default risk, even if not apparent
in repo quantities, could also manifest themselves as a worsening of the price-terms of
repo agreements. For this reason, we also examine cross-sectional variation in haircuts
and repo rates of dierent counterparties and nd that most of the variation is due to
the type of collateral rather than the credit risk of counterparties. This nding further
reinforces our conclusion that funding problems at some dealer banks are driven by
a lack of high quality collateral rather than a general reluctance of repo lenders to
40extend credit. We again focus our analysis on the end of September 2008, the time
when dealer banks faced the most adverse funding conditions.
For the purpose of this analysis, we rene our categorization of collateral to deal
with some ambiguity in classication of Treasury and Agency collateral. We create
an additional mixed Treasury/Agency category for cases in which we cannot cleanly
classify the collateral as Treasury or Agency securities. This includes cases, for example,
in which the collateral is a portfolio of Treasury and Agency securities. In these cases,
we had so far assigned the collateral type that has the highest number of counts in the
list of securities comprising the collateral portfolio. But this means that some variation
in repo rates within a category could be driven by collateral portfolio composition rather
than the characteristics of the repo counterparty. This ambiguity is not signicant
when Agency and Treasury collateral commands very similar terms in repos, but on
September 30, 2008 it could be signicant. We further put all non-Treasury, non-
Agency collateral into a private collateral group. On September 30, 2008, this group
includes almost exclusively corporate bonds or corporate equities.
The top graph in Figure 10 plots the (value-weighted) average haircuts of each
counterparty, against the CDS rate for 5-year senior debt on September 30, 2008. It is
apparent from these gures that average haircuts vary by collateral type, but within
collateral categories, they are virtually identical for dierent counterparties, irrespective
of the CDS rate. The bottom graph plots the (value-weighted) repo rate against the
CDS rate. While there is some variation in repo rates within collateral categories, this
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Figure 10: Overnight Repo Rates and Haircuts on September 30, 2008. Value-weighted
averages per counterparty
42VII Federal Reserve Programs
Any evaluation of repo quantities during the nancial crisis also must take into ac-
count that the the Federal Reserve initiated a series of funding programs, beginning in
2008Q1, that partly replaced private-sector repo lending. While these programs were
intended to oset the reduction in private sector funding of the shadow banking sector,
it is also possible that these programs attracted some repo borrowers that would have
been able to access private markets. We are not able to establish the counterfactual,
i.e., the hypothetical amount of repo lending that would have taken place in private
markets in the absence of the Fed's programs, but we can shed light on the extent to
which these programs did in fact oset the private contraction in aggregate, and the
level of individual dealer banks. We also compare the terms of the Fed facilities versus
market terms.
A Quantity of Fed Funding
We focus on four principal programs:
1. PDCF (Primary Dealer Credit Facility), March 2008: Loan facility that pro-
vided funding to primary dealers in exchange for any tri-party-eligible collateral.13
Loans were overnight, and made at the primary credit discount rate.
2. TSLF (Term Securities Lending Facility), March 2008: Facility to loan Treasuries
from the Fed's portfolio in exchange for investment-grade collateral.14 Loans were
28-day, and rates were set in an auction.
13Before September 14, 2008, the collateral was restricted to investment grade securities (Adrian,
Burke, and McAndrews (2009))
14Before September 17, 2008 the range of eligible collateral was more restricted (Fleming, Hrung,
and Keane (2009))
433. Maiden Lane I and III, various dates: Fed made loans to SPVs that held private-
label ABS. Facilities were set up in conjunction with interventions in Bear Stearns
and AIG.
4. CPFF (Commercial Paper Funding Facility), October 2008: Fed made loans to
an SPV to purchase 3-month ABCP.
We omit Maiden Lane II, because this SPV acquired assets from AIG's securities
lending business that were, prior to the crisis, funded with cash collateral that AIG
obtained in securities lending transactions, which means that these assets were not
funded with repo prior to the crisis.
The top plot in Figure 11 aggregates the private-label ABS repos of MMF and SL
along with the funding on these securities that came from the Fed through PDCF,
TSLF, and Maiden Lane I and III.15 The gure shows that Fed programs oset a
considerable portion of the contraction in repo funding starting in 2008Q1. As a result,
total funding smoothly decreases during the subsequent quarters. The bottom plot in
Figure 11 presents the same data for corporate bond repos. The Fed programs were
used much less in this case. But, the private sector funding contraction is also not as
severe.
Figure 12 presents the data for ABCP. The private sector funding contraction was
quite gradual and the CPFF was not as used. We should also add that a signicant
portion of the assets from the ABCP funded SPVs were taken back onto commercial
bank balance sheets. Commercial banks had access to alternative funding sources
including FDIC insured bank deposits and FDIC insured bond issues (see He, Khang,
and Krishnamurthy (2010)). With such alternatives it may be that the CPFF was not
15The split of SL repo between corporate debt securities and private-label ABS is calculated under
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Figure 12: ABCP oustanding (ex CPFF) and Federal Reserve (CPFF) funding
as needed as the facility directed to dealer banks.
B Fed Program Participation, by Dealer Bank
Where did the dealers with high pre-BSC private collateral shares turn for nancing?
Column (2) in Table IV shows that part of the answer is that the Fed provided the
funding through the TSLF. In schedule 2 TSLF auctions, dealer banks could bid with
investment-grade securities as collateral to obtain Treasury securities on loan against
a fee. The dependent variable in column (2) measures the extent to which a dealer
bank utilized the maximum amount that it was allowed to borrow under schedule 2
in the two schedule 2 auctions just before and after 9/30/08 (9/25/08 and 10/1/08).
For each auction, we take the ratio of the loan amount awarded to a dealer bank to
the maximum possible award, and we average this ratio across the two auctions. We
regress this dependent variable on the agency collateral share and the private collateral
46share prior to the Bear Stearns rescue (pre-BSC, December 2007 to February 2008).
As the regression results show, dealer banks with a high private collateral share tend
to max out their borrowing capacity under schedule 2.
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) also show that dealer banks with a high
Agency collateral repo share in the pre-BSC period are more likely to max out their
borrowing capacity under both schedules in the TSLF. Moreover, column (3) shows
that the total amount of borrowing under the TSLF on 9/30/08 is positively related
to both Agency and private collateral shares in the pre-BSC period. Thus, only dealer
banks with high pre-BSC Treasury collateral shares do not resort much to the TSLF
(which is sensible, as the purpose of the TSLF was to exchange non-Treasury collateral
against Treasuries).
C Fed versus Market, Program Terms
The TSLF terms appears cheaper than market terms. For example, the schedule 2
auction on 10/1/08 yielded a (uniform) loan fee of 1.51%. As the TSLF exchanges
non-Treasury collateral against Treasuries, the relevant comparison here is the spread
between Treasury repo rates and repo rates for non-Treasury collateral. Figure 10
shows that the spread for private collateral on 9/30/08 was approximately 7%.16 Thus,
the TSLF rate of 1.51% appears subsidized relative to market conditions at the time.
For Agency collateral, the comparison between the schedule 2 auction and the private
market rates is less clear-cut. The spread of Agency repo rates to Treasury repo rates
in Figure 10 is often below 1.51%. However, there is a more clear-cut distinction when
comparing the schedule 1 auction, which accepted Agency but not private collateral, to
16Private collateral on this date included a substantial amount of corporate equities, which was not
eligible as TSLF collateral. However, the average repo rates for corporate debt and corporate equities
were virtually identical on this date.
47Table IV: Fed Program Utilization by Primary Dealers in September 2008
For each dealer bank, we have two explanatory variables: Agency share pre-BSC is the proportion
of MMF repos with Agency collateral in the three-month period prior to the rescue of Bear Stearns
(December 2007 to February 2008). Private share pre-BSC is the share of corporate debt, private-label
ABS, and other non-Treasury, private-label collateral in the pre-BSC period. Dependent variables
are dened as follows: For the TSLF, maxout1 denotes average utilization of maximum available
borrowing under TSLF schedule 1 (Treasury and Agency collateral) in the two schedule 1 auctions
closest to 9/30/08 (9/18/08 and 10/2/08), maxout2 is dened accordingly as the average utilization in
schedule 2 auctions (9/25/08 and 10/1/08), while Total refers to the total notional amount of Treasury
securities borrowed from the TSLF (in $bn) on 9/30/08. PDCF Total is the total amount borrowed
from the PDCF (in $bn) on 9/30/08. We report t-statistics in parentheses.
TSLF PDCF
maxout1 maxout2 Total Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agency Share pre-BSC 1.43 0.77 46.16 9.34
(2.21) (1.58) (2.31) (0.62)
Private Share pre-BSC -0.36 1.10 39.33 57.85
(-0.48) (1.92) (1.66) (3.26)
Observations 15 15 15 15
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.28 0.36 0.42
the private repo market. The schedule 1 auction on 10/2/08 yielded a (uniform) loan
fee of 0.42%, which is lower than most of the Agency repo spreads in Figure 10. How
can we understand the dierences in these Fed and market terms, especially where the
Fed terms are set in a competitive auction? It is possible that the dierences are due
to measurement problems and not comparing repo terms on exactly identical assets.
However, it is also possible that these dierences are reective of a stigma attached
to TSLF borrowing. Indeed, as we discuss next, it is fairly clear cut that the PDCF
carried such a stigma.
Some dealers with a high pre-BSC private collateral share maxed out their funding
48under TSLF. Where did they fund their excess private collateral? As we know from
Figure 8, they did not obtain further repo funding from MMF with this type of col-
lateral. Column (4) of Table 10 provides the answer: They turned to the PDCF. The
amount borrowed from the PDCF is strongly positively correlated with the pre-BSC
private collateral share. Unlike the TSLF, dealer banks with high Agency collateral
shares however avoided the PDCF even though funding rates were attractive for pri-
vate collateral (2.25% on 9/30/08), and all collateral eligible for tri-party repo funding
was also eligible for borrowing under the PDCF. This is consistent with the view that
borrowing from the PDCF was viewed as carrying a stigma similar to the stigma associ-
ated with discount-window borrowing from the Fed (on which the PDCF was modeled).
Borrowing from the PDCF seems to be viewed as a last resort that dealer banks try to
avoid at possibly high cost. For example, Lehman Brothers did not access the PDCF
in the week prior to its bankruptcy ling (Valukas (2010)).
D Summary
Overall, these ndings reinforce the conclusion that the problem of repo was one of
funding private collateral. Any heterogeneity in funding conditions among dealer banks
was driven by the type of collateral held by the banks. The dealers with high private
collateral shares found themselves in diculty not because of a run on a counterparty
per se, but because getting repo nancing with private collateral became expensive. To
avoid high nancing costs in the repo market, dealer banks with high private collateral
shares turned to the TSLF and PDCF. Dealer banks with low private collateral shares,
in contrast, avoided the PDCF, despite the attractively low rates charged in the PDCF
relative to market rates at the time, which was likely due to a discount window stigma.
49VIII Conclusion
We examine data on the repo lending by money market funds and security lenders to
understand the role of repo in the demise of the shadow banking system, and as a factor
in the nancial crisis. Money market funds and securities lenders provide the majority
of repo funding to the shadow banking system. During the nancial crisis, repo funding
collateralized by private-label securitized assets contracted sharply. This aspect of the
data is consistent with the \run on repo" that has been prominently emphasized by
Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011b, 2011a). However, repo accounts for only a small
fraction of the short-term funding of securitized assets in the shadow banking system
prior to the crisis. This nding does not support broadbrush picture painted by Gorton
and Metrick that the expansion of repo drove the large shadow-banking system and
the subsequent run on repo caused its collapse. The short-term funding of securitized
assets through ABCP and direct investments by money market investors is an order
of magnitude larger than repo funding, and the contraction in ABCP is an order of
magnitude larger than the run on repo. A picture that emphasizes the role of short-
term debt, through both ABCP and repo, driving the expansion and collapse of the
shadow banking sector is more consistent with our data.
We nd evidence supportive of an alternative channel through which the run on
repo may have contributed to the crisis. Troubles in funding securitized assets with
repo may have been a major factor in the problems of some systemically important
dealer banks that were most heavily exposed to these assets. In this context, our
results highlight that the distinction between non-bank to dealer repo lending (which
is a source of net funding for the shadow banking system) and interdealer repo (which
reallocates liquidity within the shadow banking system) is important for understanding
50the dynamics of shadow banking. The Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer statistics,
which include interdealer and repo between dealer banks and hedge funds, show a much
more pronounced quantity contraction than the non-bank repo lending in our data. The
interdealer repo haircuts documented by Gorton and Metrick show a more dramatic
increase than the repo haircuts in our data. Taken together, these data suggest that
aected dealers acted defensively given their own capital and liquidity problems, raising
credit terms to their borrowers, producing the observed rise in interdealer haircuts, as
well as reduction in interdealer quantity. Overall, the picture therefore looks less like
the analogue of a traditional bank run by depositors and more like a credit-crunch.
Overall, our ndings are consistent with views of the crisis which emphasize a
signicant run on short-term debt nancing, but raises questions about the specic
instruments and channels underlying this run. More research is needed to understand
these important details.
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54Appendix
A Money Market Mutual Fund SEC Filings Data
Table A.I lists the fund families for which we have collected repo data as of the time of
this writing, along with the CIK numbers under which their portfolio holdings reports
are led with the SEC. Often the reports of many or all money market funds of a family
are led under the same CIK number. In other cases (e.g., Dreyfus), the reports are
led under dierent CIK numbers.
The most dicult part of the data collection is the classication of collateral. Typ-
ically, the holdings reports provide a brief description of the collateral underlying the
repo agreement, such as "U.S. Treasury Securities", or a list of specic securities (in
terms of maturity, coupon rate, and issuer). In some cases, the portfolio of securities
underlying a repo agreement can be a mix of dierent types of securities. The most
common case of mixed collateral involves Treasury securities mixed with Agency bonds
or Agency-backed MBS. private-label backed ABS or corporate bonds are only very
rarely mixed with Treasuries and Agency securities. Except in rare cases, the lings
do not report the portfolio weights. To approximate the portfolio weights, we count
the number of securities in the list of securities in the portfolio, and we assign portfolio
weights based on the relative number of times a collateral type is mentioned in this
list. For quantity calculations, we split the notional value of a repo agreement with a
portfolio of collateral based on these portfolio weights. For calculations involving repo
terms by collateral, we assign the collateral type that has the highest number of counts
in the list of securities.
Some fund families (e.g. Goldman Sachs and Fidelity) have the funds in their family
55pool much of their repo investments in a joint account. For these joint accounts, the
lings report a list of counterparties to the repos in this joint account, but only one
repo rate for the whole account, and only the total collateral amount for the whole
joint account, while notional values are listed by counterparty. We assign the single
repo rate and the same haircuts to all counterparties to the repos in this joint account.
B Risk Management Association Securities Lender
Data
Some securities lenders do not participate in the RMA survey in some quarters (see
table A.II. Participants are marked with \x"). The biggest worry in this regard is
about the non-participation of State Street in some of the surveys. State Street's cash
collateral reinvestments amount to more than $0.5 trillion, and so omission of State
Street would substantially understate the role of securities lenders. For this reason, we
impute State Streets' cash collateral reinvestment position (marked with \e" in Table
A.II). We collect the total cash collateral reinvestment amount from State Street's
10-K and 10-Q lings, and we assume that State Streets cash collateral is invested
in the same way as the aggregate cash collateral portfolio of the securities lenders
that participate in the RMA survey in a given quarter. A comparison of the portfolio
allocations in adjacent quarters in which State Street does and does not participate
does not reveal any substantial shifts in allocations. This indicates that State Streets
portfolio allocation is unlikely to be very dierent from the allocation of other securities
lenders.
56Table A.I: Sample of Money Market Fund Families
Fund family CIK numbers
AIM/Invesco 842790, 828806, 205007
Blackrock 97098
Columbia 1097519, 751200, 1477434
Dreyfus 1171061, 819940, 717341, 871967,
312564, 885409, 831363, 878092, 863471,
814236, 865440, 779128, 885408, 30158,
30160, 846421, 759667, 820482, 740766,
878092, 315783, 1038520, 1423799, 315668,
871967, 863510, 1449014, 867955, 312564,
831363, 814236, 878734, 863558, 779128,
740123, 796251, 843781








JP Morgan 1217286, 763852
Morgan Stanley 1227155, 93285, 859037, 356409
Northern 916620, 710124
Oppenheimer 836423, 312538, 1358587, 74673
Reserve 83335
Schwab 857156
UBS 225732, 780403, 1060517, 868055, 930007,
703876, 703875, 944684, 1403166
Vanguard 106830, 891190, 783401, 821404,
788599, 862341, 788606
Wells Fargo 1081400
Western 747576, 889512, 850628
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